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Abstract 
We bridge a gap between organizational economics and strategy research by developing a task-based 
approach to analyze organizational knowledge, process and structure, and deriving testable 
implications for the relation between production and organizational structure. We argue that 
organization emerges to integrate disperse knowledge and to coordinate talent in production and is 
designed to complement the limitations of human ability. The complexity of the tasks undertaken 
determines the optimal level of knowledge acquisition and talent. The relations between tasks, 
namely, complementarities or substitutabilities and synergies, determine the allocation of knowledge 
among members of the organization. Communication shapes the relation between individual talent, 
and governs the organizational process and structure that integrates disperse knowledge to perform 
tasks more efficiently. Organization structure can also be deliberately designed ex ante to correct bias 
of individual judgement, the extent to which is dependent on the attributes of tasks. Organization 
process and the routinized organizational structure are the core of organizational capital, which 
generates rent and sustains organizational growth. This task-based approach enriches the existing 
body of organization studies, in particular the knowledge-based theory of the firm and the dynamic 
capabilities theory. 
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As Hayek (1945) pointed out, the knowledge required to solve economic problems is usually
fragmented among di⁄erent individuals. Organizations exist, to a large extent, to coordi-
nate and integrate distributed information and narrowly specialized knowledge to achieve
e¢ cient economic outcomes. The purpose of this article is to investigate how the attributes
of problems that must be solved or of the tasks that must be performed determine the
knowledge distribution, organizational process and structure inside the ￿rm. We show that
organizational processes, in particular communication, function as a mechanism to integrate
knowledge and coordinate talents and thus complement the limitations to human ability in
performing complex tasks. Moreover we discuss how organization structure is designed to
cope with human limitations in decision making.
The heart of this task-based approach is that the complexity of tasks and the relationship
between tasks play a crucial role in determining organizational knowledge, span of control
and the scale of organization. The complexity of tasks, owing to production technology and
operating environment faced by a ￿rm, determines the extent of human limitation and char-
acterizes the economic activities: whether they are di¢ cult or easy, innovative or routine,
exploring or exploiting. The relationship between tasks, particularly the complementarity
among them, governs the e¢ cient distribution of knowledge among separate individual work-
ers and organizational hierarchies. The interplay between the intra-task attribute and the
inter-task attribute jointly shapes the level and structure of organizational knowledge.
Scattered knowledge must be integrated and agents with di⁄erent knowledge must be
coordinated for the production process to succeed. Even without con￿ icts of interests, coor-
dination can be very costly and integration can fail. We pay particular attention to commu-
nication as a channel to achieve e¢ cient coordination and integration. Given the complexity
of tasks, e⁄ective communication can avoid additional cost of knowledge acquisition, attain
higher output using the same reservoir of knowledge and reduce decision bias. The promi-
nent role of communication in production is due to the fact that communication allows for
knowledge leverage and thus sustains economies of scale. The extent of knowledge leverage
depends on the nature of knowledge, codi￿able or tacit, and on the technology of communi-
cation. What we emphasize is not only the level of communication, but also the process of
communication, which changes the relation between the knowledge inputs that are required
to perform tasks. This is an important aspect of organization research that calls for further
exploration. We investigate an application in decision making, in which organizational ar-
chitecture determines the mode of communication, the relation between decision makers and
the level of organizational errors.
The task-based approach to organization is closely related to a strand of knowledge-based
theory of the ￿rm, in which the ￿rm is conceptualized as a nexus of knowledge (Nelson and
Winter 1982, Kogut and Zander 1992, Conner and Prahalad 1996 and Grant 1996 among

















Figure 1: A Task Oriented Analysis of Knowledge and Organization
institution for integrating knowledge that resides in individual human capital. The most
distinctive feature of our analysis derives from the basic observation that organization is task
oriented. The characteristics of tasks and their relations are the key driving force that shapes
the process, structure and knowledge of organization. Moreover, a detailed and speci￿c
analysis of the characteristics of tasks and their relations allows us to address the issue of
knowledge acquisition without the danger of obscuring the function of organizational process.
In our view, knowledge acquisition and knowledge integration are two interacting factors in
organizational knowledge and should be jointly determined. Figure 1 outlines the task-based
approach to knowledge and organization. The analysis throughout the paper aims to ￿ll in
the task-oriented organization processes that determine the organization structure.
The task-based approach unpacks organizational capabilities into task-speci￿c ability.
Conceptually, this approach complements the resource-based theory of the ￿rm (Wernerfelt
1984, Barney 1991) and the dynamic capabilities theory (Teece 1982, Teece et al 1997 ).
Empirically the large heterogeneity in tasks across industries, ￿rms within the same industry,
divisions in the same ￿rm and even di⁄erent activities within the same division, allows us
to examine the heterogeneity in organizational practices, which in turn identi￿es the signi￿-
cance of organizational process and the source of organizational capabilities. We believe an
integration of the task-based approach into the dynamic capabilities theory will yield more
empirically relevant explanations for organization capital, organization rent and organization
growth without the tendency of fragmentation.
As we take the view that tasks are performed by embodied knowledge (human capital)
and that ￿All learning takes place inside individual human heads￿(Simon 1991), our theory
has far reaching implications for human resource management or talent strategy. The the-
ory sheds light on some heterogeneity in managerial practices. In particular, a task based
approach explains some managerial practices in Japanese ￿rms long regarded as ￿special￿.
For instance, why do Japanese ￿rms emphasize more on knowledge sharing, middle-up-down
management and process improvement than their Western counterparts? The theory also
2challenges some conventional wisdom in talent strategy on hiring of star employees and on
empowerment of human capital. Throughout the paper, we will apply the analysis to a wide
range of issues regarding human resource management.
2 Task, Knowledge and Talent
In this section, we conceptualize the function of an organization as performing a speci￿c
task, which can be selecting a project, marketing a new product, conducting a certain R&D
activity or hiring an employee. In this sense, an organization is a task performing unit or a
team that is endowed with a production function. In later sections, we will integrate these
units in various ways according to the relation between tasks.
We focus on knowledge-based production, although more general implications can be
drawn from the analysis. A knowledge-based production process is one where knowledge is
the main input in production. Throughout this paper, knowledge is referred to as know-
how and expertise to solve speci￿c problems. Organizational knowledge is thus referred to
as the knowledge that an organization acquires to perform well de￿ned tasks.1 Knowledge
can be general, such as understanding of a broad subject or narrow, such as specialized
expertise. Some knowledge is explicit, codi￿able and easily transmittable. However a large
class of knowledge is di¢ cult to codify and transfer to another person. This knowledge is tacit
(Polanyi 1966) and requires human experimentation and experience to utilize. Organizational
knowledge is often embodied in human capital. So talent is the knowledge acquired by workers
to perform tasks.
Going hand-in-hand with the knowledge-based production is uncertainty, which comes
from production technology and market environment. Uncertainty is partly a result of lim-
itations to human ability. Limited access to information, unawareness of situations, making
judgement errors and misunderstanding between people are all human nature. We admit all
these forms of bounded rationality by modelling the production process as stochastic and im-
posing costs of resolving uncertainty. Following Garicano (2000), we de￿ne a random variable
Z as the knowledge content of a task, which also indicates the problem that the worker will
confront when performing the task. Let ￿ ￿ R+ be the set of all possible problems and A ￿
￿ be the set of problems that a worker is able to solve, referred to as "knowledge set". When
production starts, the knowledge content Z 2 ￿ is drawn from an a priori known distribution
F, referred to as "knowledge distribution" of a task. The problem is solved and the task is
completed if the realized knowledge content is within the worker￿ s knowledge set, namely,
Z 2 A. Alternatively, we can interpret Z as the correctness of actions during the process of
performing the task. Z being outside the knowledge set leads to errors and the production
process ￿ gets stuck.￿
1Only in occasional cases and with explicit explanation, knowledge is referred to as the information of
personnel ability and awareness of organizational process.
3The knowledge distribution de￿nes the complexity of a task. One may measure the com-
plexity of tasks using ￿rst order stochastic dominance and second order stochastic dominance.
An e⁄ective alternative is to use certain statistical moments to characterize the complexity
of a task. For instance, the mean captures the average knowledge content of the task. A
higher mean requires more knowledge and implies more di¢ culty. The variance captures the
predictability of a task. A larger variance implies that the task is more unpredictable. The
third moment (or the skewness) captures the innovativeness feature of the task. A highly
positively skewed distribution has a thick right tail, meaning a high probability that a tricky
problem is encountered. The moments distinguish routine tasks such as assembling, book-
keeping and a number of standardized administrative jobs from complex tasks such as R&D,
fashion design and many other creative activities.
A convenient distribution to characterize the complexity of task is the exponential distri-
bution, FZ(z) = 1 ￿ e￿￿z with z ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 0 as the single shape parameter ￿ captures
the "composite" simplicity of the task￿a higher ￿ is a simpler task, a smaller ￿ is a more
complex task. 2
The central role that workers play in this single task production is to acquire knowledge
to solve problems. Talent is thus de￿ned as the knowledge set that a person attains. A more
talented worker is simply one who acquires more knowledge, which allows him to solve more
problems and complete the task with higher probability. The optimal level of knowledge or
talent is determined by a comparison between the marginal value of additional knowledge
and the marginal cost of acquiring this additional knowledge.
We give a simple example to illustrate the main ideas. Suppose that the cost of acquiring
a knowledge set A (learning all the problems in A) is proportional to its size, i.e. the ￿ number￿
of problems in it (formally, its Lebesgue measure) ￿(A). For example, ￿(A) = z if A = [0;z].
The cost (for any worker) of acquiring knowledge set A is a ￿ ￿(A), where a is a constant.
The expected output x of a worker is E(x) =
R
A dF(Z). For a continuous and nonatomic F;
a worker in autarchy confronting such a production function and knowledge distribution of
a task maximizes the expected net output y:




The optimality condition is simply
f(z￿) = a; (1)
which equates the marginal value of acquiring knowledge to the marginal cost: he learns those
2When the interest is to distinguish the impact of di⁄erent moments, one can explore more general ex-
treme value distributions, in particular FrØchet distribution (extreme value Type II) and Weibull distribution
(extreme value Type III), which are widely used in engineering and economic analysis of innovation and
di⁄usion.
4problems which are ￿ common enough￿to justify investing in them.3 The worker￿ s optimal
knowledge level is z￿ and his knowledge set is [0;z￿]. The optimal level of knowledge also
stands for the worker￿ s talent. If Z is exponentially distributed, the ￿rst order condition
￿e￿￿z￿1 = a determines a unique optimal z.4 It can be shown that the sign of dz
d￿ depends
on 2 ￿ ln ￿
a: So when the task is very complex (ln ￿
a < 2), the knowledge acquired increases
in ￿, implying that less complex task encourages more knowledge acquisition and attracts
more talented workers. This is because the marginal gain from attempting an already very
tricky problem is low and the worker is not willing to acquire a large amount of knowledge.
An increase in complexity (a decrease in ￿) depresses his incentives of acquiring knowledge.
When the task is easy (ln ￿
a > 2), the optimal knowledge acquired is high. Although further
complexity gives rise to more di¢ culty, it also brings about more opportunities to solve the
problem (a smaller ￿ leads to a thicker tail in the exponential distribution), resulting in a
even higher knowledge level.
The above analysis illuminates the ￿rst point of this article: organizational knowledge is
task-oriented. The complexity of task determines the optimal level of knowledge acquisition
and talent, possibly in a non-monotone manner.
3 Relations between Tasks and Matching of Talents
If production processes involved a sole task and a single worker, coordination would be un-
necessary and organization would not matter. In modern business, however, most productive
activities demand conducting a series of interdependent tasks, simultaneously and/or sequen-
tially. Organization emerges to integrate disperse knowledge associated with various tasks
and coordinate talent embodied in di⁄erent workers. The coordination role of organization
raises our second point: the relation between tasks that an organization needs to perform
determines the allocation of knowledge among members of the organization.
Complementarities and substitutability are two most notable relations between tasks.
Complementarities forge balanced distributed knowledge and homogeneity in talent while
substitutability leads to unbalance in the allocation of knowledge and the heterogeneity in
talent. This contrasting result was noticed in the early team theory literature (Marschak and
Radner 1972) and in recent economic analysis of corporate culture (Cremer 1993) and trade
and specialization patterns between countries (e.g. Grossman and Maggi 2000). Systematic
pursuit of the theme in the context of organizational structure and talent strategy is still
lacking although complementarities among managerial practices are widely discussed.
3Throughout this paper, we assume the regularity conditions for existence of optimum are satis￿ed. If the
the density function f(Z) is nonincreasing, the second order condition is always satis￿ed and the solution is
unique.
4The second order condition is always satis￿ed. In order to to guarantee an interior solution, the parameters
￿ and a need to satisfy ln
￿
a > 1 .
53.1 Complementarities and Homogeneity
The importance of complementarities in modern business has been well recognized in the
economics literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1995, Holmstrom 1999, and Roberts 2004).
The general principle is that factors that are complements to each other should be sorted and
bundled together. Kremer (1993) describes a vivid story about this mechanism: the malfunc-
tion of the O-rings, one of the thousands of components in the space shuttle Challenger, and
probably the cheapest, caused its explosion. Following his analysis of the O-ring production,
we demonstrate that strong complementarities of similar tasks will lead to homogenous team
through the acquisition of similar knowledge levels.
Suppose that a job consists of n tasks to be performed or problems to be solved. The
knowledge content of the job can be described by a random vector Z = (Z1;Z2;:::;Zn)0, in
which each component follows a well de￿ned distribution function as in Section 2 and the
distributions across tasks are independent. The tasks are complements in the sense that all
the tasks need to be correctly performed in order to complete the job and realize its market
value. We also assume that each worker acquires his or her knowledge independently with
the same linear cost function. Consider a case where the value of each task symmetrically










That is, production only takes place if each of the problems is solved, which, if knowledge
acquired by workers 1;2;::;n is z1;z2:::zn , happens with probability F(z1)￿F(z2)￿:::￿F(zn):




Fj(zj) = a for all i: (2)
Under regular optimality conditions, the optimal level of knowledge for a worker on task
i depends on the other team members￿knowledge. Compared to (1), there is an additional
term n
Qn
j6=i Fj(zj), re￿ ecting a typical trade-o⁄ in team work: on the one hand, a worker￿ s
contribution is ampli￿ed through the team size n; on the other hand, his probability of
success is reduced as other team members may fail. Only if n
Qn
j6=i Fj(zj) > 1; the worker
assigned to i will acquire more knowledge than when he works alone. This implies that if
the production changes from individual production to a complementary process, the worker
who originally performs task i should be trained to acquire more knowledge or replaced with
a more talented one. If n
Qn
j6=i Fj(zj) < 1; a worker should acquire less knowledge when in
a team than alone- being in a team reduces the marginal value of his talent. Thus if others
are very knowledgeable he should become more so; if others are less knowledgeable he should
become less so as well. This tendency towards homogeneity is implied by the positive cross
derivative
@2y




= 1 for all i;j ￿ n:
For a downward sloping f(z), the solution needs to satisfy zi = zj for all i;j, which means
all the workers acquire the same level of knowledge or equally talented.5 If the complexity
di⁄ers across tasks, the allocation of knowledge and talent allocation should be balanced or
homogenized to exploit the complementarities.
3.2 Substitutability and Heterogeneity
When an organization is formed to perform a job that consists of tasks that are substitutes,
the allocation of knowledge and talent to perform these tasks substantially di⁄er from when
tasks are complements. The substitutability of tasks is less well recognized in management.
After all, if tasks are substitutable, why are they bundled together as a job? But bundling
substitutable tasks is not uncommon for creative activities. For instance, high-tech companies
often employ scientists to try various alternatives and develop di⁄erent products even when
only one will be marketed.
If tasks are strongly substitutable, then production will take place whenever any one of
these tasks succeeds. Using the same setup as in Section 3.1, the expected output becomes:
E[x] = 1 ￿
n Y
i=1




A resource manager confronted with such a production function is to:
max
zi
y(z) = [1 ￿
n Y
i=1








[1 ￿ Fj(zj)] = a: (3)
First of all, notice that
@2y
@zi@zj < 0; which implies negative sorting. There is a tendency
towards heterogeneity: more talented workers are matched with less talented workers, and
all the talent is assigned to the most promising task. More precisely, the composition of
talents in a team depends on a hazard function for each task hi(zi) ￿ fi(zi)
Q
j6=i(1￿Fj(zj)),
which is the probability that the job is completed by the knowledge in the i component
5Knowledge and talent across complementary tasks may not be comparable as di⁄erent tasks may require
di⁄erent knowledge and talent. But if the tasks do not di⁄er substantially in nature, for example subtasks
on an assembing line or research on similar projects, it is not far from reasonable to compress knowledge and
talent to a single dimension.
7given that none of the other components are known. The optimality condition for an interior
solution can be rewritten as
hi(zi)
hj(zj)
= 1 8i 6= j
At the optimum, the ratio of hazard rates must be equal to the ratio of marginal costs.
The marginal bene￿t of acquiring some more knowledge about i is the conditional probability
given that the confronted problem is not in the area that is already known (it will be in the
next dzi): This must be equalized across problems up to a constant given by the cost ratio
at the optimum.
If the knowledge distribution for each task is Fi(zi) = 1 ￿ e￿￿izi for z 2 [0;z],6 all the
knowledge and talent will be only devoted to the least complex and most predictable task
(the one with largest ￿) due to the memoriless property and thus constant hazard rate of the
exponential distribution.7 This extreme example illuminates that substitutability of tasks
forges heterogeneity in the team composition.
3.3 Managerial Implications
The above two cases characterize two typical production process: the O-ring production
represents complementarities and the creative production represents substitutability. The
distinct relations between tasks yield contrasting managerial implications, in particular for
talent strategy.
1. Japanese Managerial Practices. Japanese ￿rms often have di⁄erent managerial
practices than their Western counterparts (see Womak, Jones and Roos, 1990). For example,
Japanese ￿rms emphasize multi-skill employees, knowledge sharing and process improvement.
From our point of view, these "distinct" features are actually not speci￿c to Japanese ￿rms.
They stem from the complementarities in the lean manufacturing in which the Japanese
￿rms have developed their comparative advantages. A key aspect of lean manufacturing
is no tolerance for defects￿in Toyota a worker who detects any defect may stop the whole
production line. Thus any task or any component of a task is crucial for success. When failure
occurs, the whole system needs to be overhauled. The gain from improving one single task on
its own, no matter how signi￿cant, is small. Therefore innovations tend to take the form of
process improvement as improvement in one task needs to be complemented by improvements
in other tasks. As we haves shown, complementarities in tasks lead to homogeneity of talent;
thus the use of on-the-job training, multi-skill employees and knowledge sharing as tools to
harmonize the talent of employees.
2. Explorers and Exploiters. Explorer and exploiter ￿rms (March, 1991) have di⁄er-
ent structure of tasks. Exploring is characterized by substitutabilities: if we are exploring for
6We assume that the distribution is truncated from above to avoid the counter intuitive result that knowl-
edge goes to in￿nity.
7Interior solutions can be obtained if the cost function is not linear. But the basic result that more
knowledge is acquired for the less complex task remains.
8a new idea, we succeed as long as any one team comes up with a successful idea. Thus in the
production process of creative activities, rather than seeking to create homogeneous teams
and spreading the talent around, ￿rms should seek to create a star team that concentrates
all of the talent. This kind of talent strategy is often applied in R&D divisions in companies,
in which high talents (e.g. well-known scientists) are concentrated on the most promising
tasks while junior researchers (e.g. post-docs) independently working on similar tasks to try
their chance of success. When a bottleneck is encountered, talents should be diverted to al-
ternative ways to approach the job. It is in exploration process of this kind where superstars
can realize their value. Examples are R&D, movie-making, fashion design and many other
creative activities that share this features￿they rely on a team in which only a few stars
dominate and teams of less skilled employees are used to support them.
Exploitation tasks, on the other hand, are characterized by complementarities. Success-
fully exploiting a new idea is all about responsiveness, e¢ ciency, and ￿ exibility. Competitive
advantage in exploitation is attained by delivering on time, by responding to customer needs
and by doing this at a low cost. Thus exploitation requires that each individual undertakes
his or her task successfully. As our analysis has shown, this implies that exploitation requires
balanced assignment of talent to tasks. If the allocation of talent is unbalanced, the top talent
is wasted. All workers must be of equal quality. This underlies the warning of the danger
of hiring superstar employees (Groysberg et al 2004, Huselid et al 2005). The value of a A
player can be discounted substantially in a B position and in a B team when the task con-
ducted by each member is complementary. For example, an e⁄ective problem solving team
in investment banks or consulting ￿rms needs to selectively choose members with relatively
homogenous talent.
3. Sequential Production. When a series of tasks are performed sequentially, it is of
great importance to allocate talent in the right sequence. In a complementary production
process, highest talent should be involved in the latter stages of production as getting things
right is more valuable at these stages. On the contrary, most talented workers are hired to
try the job at the very beginning if the sequential tasks are substitutable. Thus an innovative
enterprise starts with a few highly talented entrepreneurs.
4. Talent Strategy. The relation between tasks determines the relative level of knowl-
edge and talent in each task. Given a ￿xed distribution of talents, there exists an optimal
allocation rule to match the talents to tasks. When knowledge is acquirable and talent is
variable, the distribution of organizational knowledge needs to take the complexity of each
task into account. In the O-ring production, more knowledge and talent should be allocated
to the more complex tasks but the match of talents and tasks is governed by the relative com-
plexity of tasks. When tasks are substitutes, it is the relative hazard rate and thus higher
moments than variance of the knowledge distribution of a task that determines the allocation
of knowledge and talent. When tasks are not very complex in the sense that the probability
of encountering tricky problems is not high, talent needs to be allocated to various tasks and
9more talent will be assigned to the trickier problem as the (conditional) marginal probability
of completing the task is high. This may be true for mild innovative process. When innova-
tion is drastic, tasks are usually fairly complex and the probability of encountering di¢ cult
problems is quite high, allocating too much talent to the harder tasks is not worthwhile.
In reality, many production activities are a hybrid of complementarities and substitutabil-
ities. For example, a new generation of E-products requires both innovations in function and
design, which are complementary in creating added value of the product; but with regard to
either the functional aspect or the design aspect, di⁄erent ideas and inventions compete with
each other and the best one will beat all the others. Or consider the combination of basic and
applied knowledge in production. Usually basic knowledge is complementary to a variety of
applied knowledge. But the speci￿c applied knowledge developed may substitute other ap-
plied knowledge. In these hybrid cases, the pattern of organizational knowledge can be fairly
complex. But our governing principle remains: it should be governed by the complexity of
the main task and the relation between tasks.
4 Communication as an Integrating Mechanism: The Role of
Managers
In the previous section, knowledge and talent are allocated by a resource manager who knows
the ability of workers and the attributes of tasks. Each task was done by one worker, and
an organization is essentially a team executing multiple tasks, in which there is no speci￿c
mechanism to integrate knowledge and coordinate talents. While highlighting the role of
the attributes of tasks in shaping organizational knowledge, this simpli￿cation limits rich
organizational structure, which may allow for more e¢ cient division of labour and knowledge
leverage. In this section, we investigate how communication between workers functions as a
knowledge integrating mechanism and how organizational structure and talent allocation are
a⁄ected by the presence of communication.
Communication changes the relation between knowledge residing in di⁄erent workers and
restructures organizational knowledge in a substantial manner. Starting from the techno-
logical aspects of knowledge: codi￿able or tacit, we analyze how the corresponding com-
munication structures turn the technical process into an organizational process. Vertical
communication of tacit knowledge allows to leverage talent and employ hierarchies of knowl-
edge. On the other hand, horizontal communication of codi￿ed knowledge allows for the
division of labour and knowledge specialization. Finally, we investigate the case in which
communication an organization can design codes to facilitate communication.
We maintain the general setup in Section 2, and focus on how a team of workers can rely
on communication to undertake together one task. The knowledge distribution of a job is
characterized by a well behaved distribution function FZ(z) with z 2 R+ = [0;1) and its
density function f(z) over a set ￿. The knowledge acquired by worker i is characterized as
10a subset Ai ￿ R+. In principle, a worker￿ s knowledge set can be a union of subsets that
may be disjoint. To avoid this complication, we normalize the density function f(Z) to be
nonincreasing so that easier knowledge will be acquired ￿rst at optimum. This ordering has
an intuitive economic interpretation: easier questions (requiring less knowledge) are more
frequently encountered and harder questions are less common.
4.1 Tacit Knowledge and Vertical Communication
When knowledge is tacit, it is hard to formalize, express, store and transfer in some form of
code. In order to solve a problem, workers need to discuss, clarify and check the information
encompassed in the problem to be solved, irrespective of whether they know the answer or
not. Usually this communication is between workers and managers and thus vertical. The
process involves person to person and often face to face conversations and joint work. The
communication cost is mainly the opportunity cost of time that otherwise can be devoted
to production. Certain types of technological progress such as e-mail and video conferences
may reduce communication cost. It is also possible that the cost diminishes through frequent
and repeated interactions. In this subsection, we adapt a simpli￿ed model from a general
treatment of the issue in Garicano (2000) to demonstrate the main mechanism.
Consider a simple organization with n + 1 team members to carry out production that
involves problem solving as before. There are two organizational alternatives: a one-layer
structure in which all members devote their time to production and a two-layer structure with
n production workers and 1 manager who can help the workers to solve problems. Suppose the





[F(Ai) ￿ a￿(Ai)]: (4)
By the assumption of identical and independent distribution and the linear cost function,
the optimal condition is reduced to the ￿rst order condition: f(zi) = a. The team size can be
pinned down elsewhere, as there are no organizational constraints to team size when workers
work on their own, for example through market competition (e.g. free entry).
In a two-layer organization, there is a manager who may acquire more knowledge and
spend time helping production workers who cannot deal with their own problem due to the
limitation of their knowledge. However, help incurs communication costs: it takes time for a
worker to propose a question and for a manager to ￿gure out a solution. For simplicity, we
assume that a request from a worker incurs a ￿xed helping cost h, which is proportional to
the production time of the worker and borne only by the receiver for notational simplicity.




[F(Ai [ Am) ￿ a￿(Ai)] + tp









Here Am is the manager￿ s knowledge set and Ai is each worker￿ s knowledge set. By the
downward sloping assumption of f(z), Ai = [0;zw] and Am = [0;zm], where zw and zm
are the knowledge level acquired by each worker and the manager respectively. As a result,
Ai [ Am = [0;zm].8 t
p
m is the manager￿ s time devoted to production and th
m to helping
workers.
Compared to (4), the two-layer organization allows for a division of labor and maybe more
knowledge acquisition. The manager plays a key role in this process: she is able to leverage
her knowledge ￿it will be worthwhile to learn unusual problems, since she can use it to answer
questions from an entire team. But this advantage comes with two costs. One is the cost of
acquiring additional knowledge. The other is that helping others competes away her time for
production. The communication cost can be seen from the constraints. The ￿rst constraint
says that the overall time for the manager is limited to a normalized unit. Since time is
always valuable, this constraint will bind at optimum. The second constraint is essentially an
identity that equates the communication time from both sides of the communicators (time
answering questions must be equal to time asking questions)
It can be shown that t
p
m = 0 and th
m = 1. That is the manager completely specializes
in problem solving. This is because if it pays to spend the ￿rst fraction of time leveraging
time to help some workers then it is rewarded to spend all other units of time in helping and
not producing. Formally, the value of extra time ￿tm on production is ￿tmF(zm), while
the value of time helping workers is ￿tm
h
F(zm)￿F(zw)
1￿F(zw) ; and both are linear in ￿tm. Then the
objective function is reduced to
maxR2(zm;zw;n) = nF(zm) ￿ anzw ￿ azm
subject to
1 = [1 ￿ F(zw)]hn:
The solution is pinned down by the conditions:
8Here we assume that the manager needs to know the worker￿ s knowledge in order to solve the problem.











































Figure 2: The bene￿t of hierarchy is that it allows the manager to leverage his knowledge
in problem solving (F(zm)) by combining it with the time of less knowledgeable workers, so
that the team solves more problems; the cost is that the number of problems tackled is lower
than in autarchy (n+1>n), since 1 unit of time (the manager￿ s time endowment) is spent in
communication.





1 = nh[1 ￿ F(zw)] (8)
From (6), the optimal knowledge level in the two-layer organization is higher than in the
one-layer organization: the marginal value of manager knowledge is larger, as it is spread over
n workers. This is exactly the e⁄ect of knowledge leverage which allows for specialization and
a higher knowledge level. Second, given that f(zm) is decreasing in zm, a more knowledgeable
manager attains a larger span of control. third, it can be shown from the second condition
(7) that dzm
dzw > 0; which implies that the manager￿ s talent is complementary to the worker￿ s
talent. Interestingly but intuitively, the number of workers increase in the knowledge they
acquire since a more knowledgeable worker asks fewer questions and gives more time to other
workers. A comparison of the hierarchical production and the production absent of hierarchy
is illustrated in Figure 2.
A full model without restrictions on the number of layers is developed in Garicano (2000).
13In this model, a knowledge hierarchy e¢ ciently integrates tacit knowledge. Members in
the organization specialize either in production or in solving problems and only one class
specializes in production (referred to as production workers). Those who specialize in problem
solving are managers allocated at the higher level of the hierarchy. Production workers learn
to solve the most common problems; managers or problem solvers learn the exceptions. The
higher is a member in the hierarchy, the more unusual the problems she is able to solve.
Moreover the organization has a pyramidal structure, each layer possessing a smaller size
than the previous one.
The complexity of task a⁄ects the allocation of knowledge and talent through the optimal
level of overall knowledge acquisition and then division of labor. A more complex task requires
more overall knowledge. When knowledge is tacit and communication takes time, more
complex tasks reduce the span of control for the manager or widens the worker￿ s knowledge.
It also increases the number of layers of the organization required to solve a given proportion
of problems.
4.2 Codi￿ed Knowledge and Horizontal Communication
When knowledge is codi￿able, it is easy to explicitly express and record in the form of hard
data, scienti￿c formulae, coded procedures. It is possible to transfer codi￿ed knowledge with-
out distortion, which results in horizontal communication across people performing di⁄erent
tasks. In this case, communication can be impersonal and takes the form of market trans-
actions of knowledge. What prevents communication from ￿ owing outside the organization
is the production process and the transaction costs. For example, when production consists
of a series of interdependent tasks, the value of knowledge for each task is hard to separate
and price in the market. Therefore, the bene￿t of communication is the possibility of spe-
cialization and the saving of the cost of knowledge acquisition while the communication cost
is related to knowledge coding and transferring. The following simple model, inspired by
Becker and Murphy (1992), illustrates the main idea.
We use similar setup as in the previous subsection except that now the hierarchical struc-
ture is replaced by a horizontal chain. The resource manager must choose the size of the
team n ￿ 1 and to allocate knowledge sets Ai to each team member:
max
fAig;n￿1
Pr(Z ￿ [iAi)n ￿
n X
i=1
a ￿ ￿(Ai) ￿ H(n): (9)
The ￿rst term is the expected output per unit time when the knowledge content of the
task lies in the team￿ s overall knowledge set and thus the problem is solved, times the number
of units of time available. The second term is the total cost of acquiring relevant knowledge.
Each worker acquires his or her knowledge independently and has the same linear cost function
of the Lebesgue measure of the knowledge set; ￿(Ai). The last term is the overall horizontal
communication cost, a function of the number of communicators. With the assumption that
14f(z) decreases in z, at optimum Pr(Z ￿ [iAi) = F(zn), ￿(Ai) = zi ￿ zi￿1, with i ￿ 1 and
z0 = 0. Then the optimization problem (9) reduces to
max
zn;n￿1
nF(zn) ￿ azn ￿ H(n):
This reformulation clearly shows the bene￿ts when communication is present: the possi-
bility of division of labor and the saving of knowledge acquisition cost. The team members
divide their labor to specialize on a non-overlapping subset of the knowledge and integrates
them into overall organization knowledge through communication. Therefore the cost of ac-
quiring each piece of knowledge is paid once but the knowledge is used n times. This echoes
the fundamental economic rationale pointed out by Rosen (1983): knowledge implies a ￿xed
cost independent of its utilization and thus it always pays to let workers learn a narrower
set of tasks and use it more intensely. How narrow the specialization should be and how
intensity the knowledge should be used crucially depend on the communication cost.
If the cost function H(n) is linear in n, which implies that communication does not cause
any information jam, the optimal team size is either 0 or N; an exogenous upper bound of
the number of individuals. Useful knowledge (i.e. as long as f(:) > 0) is either never used
or used as many times as possible. In other words, either the team does not exist or, in the
words of Adam Smith, ￿the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market￿ .
However, as Becker and Murphy (1992) have argued, coordination costs are in fact what
limits the division of labor. If communication costs increase in a convex way with team size,
then we have an interior team size. Suppose, for instance, that H(n) is quadratic: cn2
2 . Under





The knowledge distribution of the task and the e¢ ciency of knowledge acquisition and
communication jointly determine the optimal overall amount of knowledge and the size of
the team, which governs the degree of labor division. An advance in knowledge acquisition
or/and a decrease in communication cost due to improvements in information technology or
common understanding of knowledge will induce ￿ner division of labour and an expansion of
team size.9
Note that the organization knowledge zn and the team size n increase in each other.
This reinforcement e⁄ect is due to the implicit complementarities between each member￿ s
knowledge: the presence of other member￿ s knowledge increases the probability of solving
the problem or saves the cost of knowledge acquisition. In general, greater complementaries,
which can be re￿ ected by zn in this simple example, tend to increase specialization. This is
the reason that greater division of labor and specialization are observed in more developed
9These intuitions can be readily seen if we assume that zn is exponentially distributed: F(zn) = 1￿e
￿￿zn,





15economies, as emphasized by Becker and Murphy (1992). They also derive some empirical
implications of the importance of coordination costs in specialization. In small towns or rural
areas, specialization is indeed limited by the extent of the market￿i.e. it must indeed be
the case that each specialist has some monopoly power in his or her own area of expertise.
In large metropolitan areas in which many doctors or lawyers have the same skills, however,
it must be that coordination costs are the answer to the limitation of team size given these
duplications.
4.3 Codi￿able Knowledge: Optimal Code and Organization Structure
We have discussed two examples in which knowledge is either completely tacit or fully codi-
￿able. In reality, knowledge possesses both dimensions of properties: knowledge is partially
codi￿able. In this situation, codes, which are a shared technical language between work-
ers, form an important part of the communication infrastructure of ￿rms and organizations
(Arrow 1974). Miscoded knowledge may lead to ambiguity, confusion, misunderstanding
and ine¢ ciency in communication and production. An optimal design of codes needs to
trade o⁄ between specialization and commonality. On the one hand, a narrow specialized
code facilitates communication within a particular function that performs a task, but limits
communication between functions that perform various tasks and thus makes coordination
between tasks more costly. On the other hand, a broad common code improves coordination
across tasks at the expense of less precise and more costly communication within task. In
this subsection, we use a simpli￿ed variant of Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007) to explore
the e⁄ects of the attributes of tasks and the synergies between tasks on the design of codes
and the interplay of optimal codes and organizational structure.
4.3.1 A Simple Model of Code
A team of two workers, worker 1 and worker 2 are employed to perform a task. As in the case
of tacit knowledge and vertical communication, if worker 1 is not able to perform the task
or solve the problem associated with the task, he can ask for help from worker 2. However
this kind of vertical communication is limited by two forms of bounded rationality. First,
both workers have a limited ability to learn codes which allow for the identi￿cation of exact
problems. Second, they have a limited ability to solve problems that involve incomplete
information. An example would be a team that is composed of a salesman and an engineer
to serve clients, who have problems with products or services. The salesman can classify
problems raised by clients but not perfectly. The engineer and the salesman have to rely on a
previously speci￿ed and agreed code to transmit coarsely information. In order to make the
intuition more transparent, we carry on this example to interpret the following model and
use salesman for worker 1 and engineer for worker 2. The basic implications apply to many
other tasks and occupations.
16As in the previous sections, we assume that the knowledge content of task z is drawn
from a distribution function Fz with the probability density function fz on a set ￿. That is
clients approach salesmen with a problem that demands a solution z with probability fz > 0
from Z. The salesman, after reviewing the problem, sends a code to the engineer. Formally,
a code C is a partition f￿1;￿2;:::;￿Kg of the set ￿; where the subscript of the ￿s represents
a word k that gives the information that the problem z belongs to the subset ￿k. The breath
of word k is nk; the number of of events that ￿k contains when ￿ is ￿nite or the ￿ size￿(the
Lebesgue measure) of ￿k when ￿ is a continuum. A code Ct = f￿;?g represents extremely
coarse information and implies the knowledge is tacit and not codi￿able. A code with a very
large K or a very small k represents precise information and the knowledge is codi￿able.
For simplicity, we normalize the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t from solving a client￿problem to 1 and its
target is just to minimize the expected communication cost between the salesman and the
engineer, de￿ned as D(C;F) =
K X
k=1
pkd(nk), where pk is the frequency of a word k being sent.
The per unit communication cost, which can be regarded as "diagnosis cost" of the problem,
depends on the precision of the information (the breath of word) sent by the salesman . It
is natural to assume that the cost is increasing in the breath of k as less precise information
brings about more costly communication. This simple speci￿cation leads to some intuitive
results: a code should use precise words for frequent events and vaguer words for more unusual
ones; a more unequal distribution of events increases the value of the creation of a specialized
code, since the precision of the words can be more tightly linked to the characteristics of the
environment.
The following two-word-code example illustrates the main ideas. Suppose that a sales-
man deals with consumers￿ s problems z 2 [0;1] drawn from a distributions with cumulative
distribution function
F(z) = (1 ￿ b)z + bz2;
and density
f(z) = (1 ￿ b) + 2bz;
with b 2 [￿1;1] being a measure of the evenness of the distribution. At b = 0, the distribution
is uniform and the distribution becomes more uneven when b deviates more from 0. We also
assume that codes can have at most two words, K = 2, and that the diagnosis cost is linear
in the breath of word. The optimal code problem is to
min
z
D(C;F) = F (z)z + (1 ￿ F (z))(1 ￿ z)
This optimization yields a unique cuto⁄ b z that splits the set ￿ into two words: ￿1 = [0;b z)
and ￿2 = [b z;1]: At b = 0, b z = 1
2. Since each problem is equally likely to occur, there is
no need to use codes with di⁄erent precision. When b 6= 0; b z = 1
6b
￿





Obviously f0(z) > 0 and b z > 1
2 if b > 0, and f0(z) < 0 and b z < 1
2. This delivers the result
17that more precise code is used to deal with more frequent problems. It can be shown that b z
deviates further from 1
2 when jbj deviates more from 0, which implies that a more specialized
code is adopted when the distribution of problems is more unequal. For future reference,
de￿ne the optimal cost at b 6= 0 as
D￿(b2) =
8 + 36b2 ￿
￿
4 + 3b2￿ 3
2
54b2 : (10)
4.3.2 Integration and Separation
We have illustrated that optimal codes are designed to facilitate vertical communication
between workers that perform the same tasks within the same organization unit. In many
situations, communication is horizontal and takes place between people that perform di⁄erent
tasks in di⁄erent working units. Then tailoring codes to the needs of particular agents in
an organization unit may be costly as it limits the set of agents among whom the codes are
useful. The design of optimal codes needs to take into account the possible synergies across
tasks and organization units. Two organizational units that face similar tasks will not ￿nd a
common code too costly and they should be integrated through the same code.
We extend the simple two-word-code model discussed above to allow two service or func-
tional units A and B. Each of them is composed of one salesman and one engineer. We
focus on two possible organizational forms as shown in Figure 3 (Panel A and Panel B):
(1) Separation (the two units use di⁄erent codes); (2) Integration (the two units share the
same code). To generate a need for coordination, there must be a potential synergy among
the two services, which we model as follows. Customers arrive randomly, and there may be
excessive load in one service and excessive capacity in the other. If that happens, the two
services bene￿t from diverting some business from the overburdened service to the other. For-
mally, suppose that salesmen from services A and B deal with consumers from two di⁄erent
distributions FA and FB,
Fi(z) = (1 ￿ bi)z + biz2; i = A;B
with bA = b and bB = ￿b and b 2 [￿1;1]. Let z￿
i be the cuto⁄ between words of each service,
with (by symmetry) z￿
B = 1 ￿ z￿
A; and D￿
i(b) the expected diagnosis cost in either service as
in (10).
Each engineer has the ability to attend to the needs of at most one client. Salesmen bring





0 with probability p,
1 with probability (1 ￿ 2p),
2 with probability p,
where p belongs to the interval [0;1=2]. This arrival process captures the e⁄ect of the vari-
18ability in the expected number of clients of each type. If p is low, then each salesman is
likely to ￿nd one client per period of each type. When p is high, although on average still
1 client is arriving, it is quite likely that either none or 2 will arrive. Thus p measures the
importance of the synergy between the two services: a high p means that the services are
likely to need to share clients, while a low p means that each service is likely to have its
capacity fully utilized. As before, we assume a linear function of the diagnosis cost with a
constant coe¢ cient ’ 2 (1;2). 10
An integrated organization requires that a salesman from service unit A explain to an
engineer in B the needs of his customer. Such a cross-unit explanation requires a common
code in both services. It is intuitive that the common language is the one that would be chosen
when the density of tasks is the average of the two densities of the two services.11 In this
simple example, since both services have opposing distributions, the average problem density
is uniform. The optimal code has two equally imprecise words, with each word identifying
the sales lead as coming from one half of the distribution. The total pro￿ts then are:12




In a separated organization, where the two services use di⁄erent codes, the expected pro￿t
is:
￿(p;b;’jCS) = 2(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’D￿(b2)):
The organization should be integrated rather than separated if the between service improve-
ment in communication (measured by the synergy gain) is larger than the within service loss
in precision due to the worsening of the code used:








It can be shown that an increase in the synergy parameter p, a decrease in the diagnosis
cost ’ or a decrease in jbj, the divergence in the distribution of tasks, makes the integrated
organization more pro￿table. The result characterizes the determinants of the trade-o⁄ be-
tween separate, well-adapted codes optimized for within-service communication, and broader
common codes that allow for between-service communication. Separate codes are preferable
when synergies are relatively low, when the underlying probability distributions confronting
the di⁄erent units are su¢ ciently di⁄erent, or when diagnosis costs are high so that there is a
10The restriction on ’ ensures positive pro￿ts. It also ensures that information must transit through a
salesman before being sent to an engineer; indeed an engineer without information on the client￿ s problem
would have diagnosis costs greater than the pro￿ts obtained from solving it.
11For a formal proof, see Corollary 1 in Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007).
12The probability that a problem is solved the sum of 1) 1 ￿ 2p, the probability that only one problem
arrives and is passed to the engineer within the same unit; 2) p, the probability that two problems arrive and
one is always passed to the engineer within the same unit; 3) p
2, the probability that two problems arrive and
one is passed to the engineer in other unit that has no problem arriving.
19Figure 3: Communication in Three Possible Organizational Forms
high premium on communicating precisely. As a result, increases in synergies, in the equality
of the distributions or decreases in diagnosis costs increase code commonality.
4.3.3 Translator and Hierarchy
An alternative to integration to exploit the synergy between two distinct units is to introduce
a hierarchical superior as a translator, who enables services with di⁄erent codes to cooperate.
For instance, if salesman A has two customers, he communicates to the translator the type
of the ￿ extra￿customer in the code used in service A. The translator will search for z, and
then he will transmit the information to engineer B in the code used in service B. (Panel C
in Figure 3).
Assume that hiring a translator requires incurring a ￿xed cost ￿, but since the transla-
tor is specialized in language, her diagnosis cost is lower than that of the engineers. The
optimal organization choice depends crucially on communication costs and the translator￿ s
advantage. Hierarchies are more e¢ cient when communication costs are high, whereas low
communications costs favor their replacement by common codes and horizontal communica-
tions. Consider ￿rst the comparison between translation and separation. Translation incurs
the ￿xed cost ￿ and increases diagnosis costs, but makes inter-service communication possi-
ble and thus allows the services to pro￿t from the existing synergies. If the diagnosis cost
’ is low, the extra communication cost incurred by translation is low and the net bene￿t is
likely to be high. Thus, translation is more likely to beat separation when ’ is low. Consider
the choice between translation and integration. Translation saves on communication cost by
allowing services to keep e¢ cient service-speci￿c codes ￿thus translation is likely to beat
integration when ’ is high, since communication savings are more important when ’ is high.
Thus if the ￿xed cost ￿ of hiring a translator is low enough, there exists an interval of ’ for
which the hierarchical structure is optimal.
204.4 Managerial Implications
1. The role of management in knowledge usage. We have analyzed the role of com-
munication as organizational process to integrate disperse knowledge and its e⁄ects on or-
ganizational structure. For di⁄erent types of knowledge, di⁄erent modes of communication,
horizontal, vertical or a hybrid of both, are adopted. Regardless of the communication modes,
the general function of communication is to allow for specialization of knowledge and division
of labour. The role of management (and of ￿rms) is very di⁄erent in each case:
￿ Tacit Knowledge: The role of management is to participate in the acquisition and
optimal use of knowledge, by dealing with exceptions. Hierarchies are thus devised to
facilitate the leveraging of knowledge.
￿ Codi￿able knowledge: Management still has the management by exception role
above for the knowledge that is within a particular area. But management serves also
to facilitate communication between areas of knowledge by translating the di⁄erent
codes. Managers are here both leveraging their own knowledge but are also ￿ tra¢ c
cops￿able to help workers communicate across areas.
￿ Coded Knowledge: In this case, horizontal specialization is the norm; each individual
learns a narrow interval and knows which speci￿c horizontal expert to ask if he comes
up with something he does not know. Managers do not have a role in the knowledge
acquisition process in this case
2. Knowledge hierarchies and management by exception: Knowledge hierarchies
allow high talent can specialize in exceptional problems. This "management by exception"
was well stated by Alfred Sloan (1924, P. 195), who in describing his job, claimed that ￿we
do not do much routine work with details. They never get up to us. I work fairly hard, but it
is on exceptions..., not on routine or petty details.￿In the presence of communication costs,
knowledge chains or hierarchies emerge with the more knowledgeable placed on the top as
managers. These managers acquire knowledge about exceptional problems and specialize in
solving problems from their subordinates. A knowledge hierarchical structure is advantageous
only if the size of organization is large enough￿leveraging the knowledge of highly skilled
managers (where knowledge can be broadly construed as knowledge of opportunities, clients
etc.) requires assigning them better workers so that they can be protected from the ￿ dumb￿
questions anyone else could deal with.
3. Tacit knowledge and skill complementarities. The theory also generates di⁄ering
managerial implications when ￿rms￿main knowledge has di⁄erent technological aspects. One
important feature of managerial practices in Japanese ￿rms is the emphasis on tacit knowledge
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). We have shown that when the knowledge is tacit, the manager￿ s
knowledge is endogenously complementary to the workers￿knowledge. In order to sustain
21a larger organization, both the manager and workers have to acquire more knowledge.13
This suggests that when tacit knowledge is important in the production and communication
process, an expansion of ￿rm size by hiring superstar top managers may lead to organizational
failure as mediocre subordinates may compete away too much time of high talents. A rapid
expansion of ￿rm size is more likely to succeed when knowledge is codi￿able because hiring
less knowledgeable workers is less likely to tax top managers (as the knowledge of di⁄erent
workers is easy to substitute for). Thus a higher level of overall knowledge can be obtained
by increasing the team size without increasing each worker￿ s knowledge level. When an
organization is able to determine the adoption of codes, the problem-solving capabilities
of the organization depend on the codes that are used by its members. An improvement of
communication codes, which can become either more specialized or more broad depending on
the tasks, allows an organization to economize on communication costs and exploit synergies.
4. Impact of Information and Communication Technology. The models yield rich
and perhaps surprising implications about the interplays between organizational change and
the improvements in information and communication technologies (ICT). Unlike the usual
treatment of ICT as homogeneous, we distinguish two types of progress in ICT. One type
is related to cheaper acquisition of knowledge, resulting, for example, from the introduction
of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). The other is related to more e¢ cient communica-
tion resulting, for example, from improvements in IP-based and wireless communications.
Decreases in the cost of both communicating and acquiring knowledge increase the level of
organizational knowledge and in general lead to an expansion of organization. However,
they have opposite impacts on the discretionality of the production workers (bottom at the
knowledge hierarchy or chain) and the managers (at the upper positions of the knowledge
hierarchy or chain). Cheaper acquisition of knowledge increases the knowledge scope of pro-
duction workers and thus reduces the frequency of interventions from above. On the other
hand, better communication of the knowledge reduces the knowledge scope of the production
workers and increases the need for interventions. This challenges the view that improvements
in ICT leads to more delegation of power and ￿ attened organization. Bloom et al (2009) use
detailed international plant-level data and ICT information to show evidence consistent with
the theory that we have described.
The theory on optimal communication codes illuminates the relationship between de-
centralization and information technology which have been widely discussed both in the
economics literature and in the business press. Accounting systems, human resource and
other organizational databases are codes, in the sense in which economics understands them.
In recent years, the management of these codes within ￿rms has become more centralized,
while communications have become less hierarchical and while, at the same time, decision
making has become more decentralized. Robert J. Herbold, Chief Operating O¢ cer for
13Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop a general equilibrium version of the model with heterogeneous
workers, where workers must sort into teams.
22Figure 4: A poliarchy/market/decentralized architecture versus a hierarchy/centralized one
Microsoft from 1994 to 2001, described this apparent paradox as follows: ￿standardizing
speci￿c practices and centralizing certain systems also provided, perhaps surprisingly, bene-
￿ts usually associated with decentralization.￿This paradox re￿ ects the rationale behind the
theory: better management of communication codes substitutes bureaucracies and allows for
decentralizations.
5 Decision Bias and Organizational Architecture
The previous section establishes the third point of this article: communication shapes the
relation between individual talent and integrates disperse knowledge to perform tasks more
e¢ ciently. Organizational structure is an endogenous outcome of interactions between people.
However, organization can also be deliberately designed ex ante to complement limitations
to human knowledge and judgement, the extent to which is dependent on the attributes of
tasks. This is the fourth point of our article. Following the spirit of March and Simon (1958)
and Cyert and March (1963), we consider the context of decision making in organizations.
Two issues are of particular interests: how should decision makers be organized to minimize
aggregate errors or bias in decision making? how much knowledge should decision makers
acquire in order to take advantages of the organizational choice? We adopt a simpli￿ed
variant of a model developed by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) to illustrate the main insights and
extend it to address the issues about knowledge acquisition, talent allocation and the impact
of the complexity of task.
5.1 A Simple Model
23Agents in an organization need to evaluate and decide whether to accept a project that
possesses stochastic knowledge content Z and yields random outcome X.14 As in the previous
sections, Z follows a distribution function F(z) with a probability density function f(z), which
is again assumed to be decreasing in z, f0(z) < 0. Suppose that X is a strictly monotonic
transformation of Z to capture the idea that more knowledge yields larger output. For
simplicity, we assume X = Z + ￿, where ￿ can be ￿xed value or a noisy random variable.
Limited rationality of the agents means that when evaluating the project, they do not know
the exact knowledge content but only the knowledge distribution. Potentially they may
form two types of bias: reject a good project (Type-I error in terms of statistics inference)
or accept a bad project (Type-II error). The agents try to reduce potential errors by a
screening function s, which assigns a nonnegative probability to an "acceptable" project
based on individual judgement. We assume that s is a continuous increasing function in
z for two reasons: 1) more knowledge yields larger output, which makes the project more
acceptable; 2) more knowledge allows better screening. Following the literature of statistical






With perfect screening, all projects with x > 0 are accepted while those with x < 0 are
rejected. The system of screening does not mater. However screening always has defects as
"to err is human" and information is never perfect. We consider two alternative screening
systems: a polyarchy and a hierarchy (See Figure 4). In a polyarchy, decision making is
decentralized to multiple independent screens. So a project is accepted if it is approved by
any evaluator. In a hierarchy, decision making is centralized to the top through successive
screens. A project is accepted only if it passes all evaluators￿screening. Note that there is no
communication in a polyarchy as all evaluators work independently and make their decisions
simultaneously. In a hierarchy, the communication between the evaluators is limited to a
binary signal "Accept, Reject". Implicitly the evaluators￿decisions are substitutes under
polyarchy and complements under hierarchy. In the following discussion, we focus on a
simplest case in which there are only two level of evaluators. Then the probability that a
project is approved is pP(z) = s(z) + s(z)[1 ￿ (s)] = 2s(z) ￿ s2(z) under polyarchy and
pH(z) = s2(z) under hierarchy. Immediately we can see the result that with the same
screening criterion a polyarchy is more likely to accept the project than a hierarchy. In other
words, the incidence of making type-II error is relatively high under polyarchy while the
incidence of type-I error is relatively high under hierarchy.
We proceed to examine the optimal organizational structure when the screening function
s(z) is exogenously given; the reader is directed to Sah and Stiglitz(1986) for the case where
it is endogenous. Moreover, we assume the outcome X = Z +￿0, where ￿0 is a ￿xed number
that can be negative. As the screening rule is exogenous, knowledge acquisition does not
14Alternatively, we can assume that agents need to evaluate a continuum of projects, which are generated
by certain stochastic process. A project can be regarded as a task with broad intepretation, for instance as
hiring talents.
24matter for decision making. Hence we only consider the expected return of the organization
that evaluates the project:
yO(z) =
Z
(z + ￿0)pO(z)dF(z); (11)
where O = H;P denotes hierarchy and polyarchy respectively. The comparison of the
performance under two organizations ￿y = yL ￿ yH =
Z
(z + ￿0)[pL(z) ￿ pH(z)]dF(z) is in
general ambiguous since pL(z)￿pH(z) can be either concave or convex in z. In the case that
s(z) is linear in z, a polyarchy performs better than a hierarchy depending on the tightness
of screening. If the screening function is su¢ ciently tight (small s(z)), a polyarchy will
outperform a hierarchy as the latter tends to kill many good ideas (more incidence of type-I
errors. On the other hand, a hierarchy will achieve better performance through disciplining
Type-II errors when the screening function is slack. Moreover, it can be shown that the
relative organizational performance depends on the tension between the mean, the variance
and the skewness of the knowledge distribution of the project. Generally, a polyarchical
decision structure has more advantages when a project is more innovative, in the sense that
it is less predictable and has lots of upsides in the right tail of the knowledge distribution.
5.2 Managerial Implications: Why Existing Companies Do Not Innovate
When making decisions regarding innovative projects or more generally activities that yields
uncertain outcome, people make mistakes even if they do not distort their incentives. They
may turn down projects that are actually valuable or approve projects that have no merit.
Di⁄erent organizational designs have di⁄erent advantages in handling each type of these
errors. Essentially, organizations can choose to devolve authority for project approval down
to the bottom of the hierarchy (decentralization) or they can force decisions to travel up
the hierarchy (centralization). In a decentralized system, an agent makes decision without
intervention from others. The lack of control means ￿ everything goes￿ : projects are more
likely to be accepted. But this is not necessarily bad , even though there is a risk that too
many worthless projects will be undertaken. If a project or an activity has a lot of upside at
the very knowledge intensive stages, a polyarchy tends to outperform a hierarchy. In a more
centralized architecture, where projects have to pass through multiple steps in order to be
approved, few projects will be accepted. It is likely that whatever passes the multiple screen
will be good, but some valuable projects will get turned down by the bureaucracy. Again
hierarchy does not mean "bad" although bureaucracy does kill ideas. It is simply the result
of a trade-o⁄ between killing too many good ideas and letting pass too many bad ones.
This partially explains the stylized fact that well-established ￿rms are not proli￿c at
innovating. In an established ￿rm, reputation increasingly becomes important to sustain
the coherence between a corporate image and products. Making mistakes could have serious
negative impact on the ￿rm. Therefore a hierarchical structure is needed to maintain and
25enhance the reputation. For example, approving new products in a mature ￿rm with a strong
reputation will involve a highly bureaucratic process with numerous steps and procedures.
Other examples may be an industry subject to a lot of public scrutiny or activities such as
risk management where loss is potentially large but gain is little.
In terms of talent allocation, talent is more valuable and more knowledge is acquired in
a decentralized organization, where no other agent is located to check whether mistakes are
made. Conversely, centralized organizations with multiple screens are more likely to correct
early mistakes, and thus do not need too much knowledge or very talented agents in each
layer.
6 Organizational Capital, Rent and Growth
We have gone through a journey to discuss how to organize things right. A large empirical
evidence has demonstrated that the extent of "organizing right" is one of the determining
factors explaining the large heterogeneity in ￿rm performance in the same industry (Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt 1996, Ichiniowski et al 1997, Black and Lynch 2001, Bloom and Van Reenen
2007 among a rapid expansion of systematic empirical studies and detailed case studies).
Industrial leaders are usually not only technological leaders but also organizational leaders.
Organizational practices or more broadly managerial practices are important capital that can
be accumulated, generate rent and sustain organizational growth.
6.1 Organizational Capital
There exist various views of organizational capital. Prescott and Visscher (1980) de￿ne
organizational capital as information: "what the ￿rm knows about the abilities of its personnel
...the potential for improving matches between employees and jobs." They also include human
capital into organizational capital, regarding organizational capital as embodied in employees
as in Becker (1993). Evenson and Westphal (1995) consider "organization capital...[is] the
knowledge used to combine human skills and physical capital into systems for producing
and delivering want-satisfying products." Amit and Scoemaker (1993) think of organization
capital as strategic assets that is "the set of di¢ cult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable
and specialized resources and capabilities that bestow the ￿rm￿ s competitive advantage."15
The task-based approach recognizes the organization process that optimizes the relations
between tasks, between talents and between tasks and talents as the core of organizational
capital. It is true that information of personnel and knowledge of organizational process are
important for the formation of organizational capital. But information and knowledge per
se may not be speci￿c to a ￿rm and may not be accumulated. It is the process of acquiring,
storing, transferring and integrating information and knowledge that is speci￿c to a ￿rm and
15Amit and Schoemaker do not de￿ne organization captial directly. Rather they de￿ne "organizational
rents" as economic rents generated by strategic assets.
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capital or information. We have shown that communication is an crucial mechanism that
integrates knowledge and coordinate talents. Thus communication rather than the commu-
nication technology is the organizational capital. For example, a new information system
(e.g. ERP) that is introduced in a ￿rm is not organizational capital. It is the process of
deploying this information system, which facilitates the communication of knowledge and
improves division of labor and leverage of talent, that forms organizational capital. Orga-
nizational processes always involve personal interactions. Therefore organizational capital is
accumulated through formally designed process as well as repeated tacit interactions among
workers.
We distinguish organizational capital from human capital for theoretical and practical
reasons although they are always inter-wined. The relative mobility of human capital in the
market allows managers to identify organizational failure. A sudden collapse of a ￿rm due
to brain drain is a signal for weak organizational capital. In other words, a ￿rm with strong
organizational capital should be able to replace human capital from the market to mitigate
shocks and avoid failure.
Two factors make it hard to measure organizational capital. First, organizational capital
is intangible assets and di¢ cult to measure directly. Second, organizational capital is speci￿c
to a ￿rm and its value can not be explicitly priced in the market. As a result, one has to rely
on some indirect measures or variations to identify organizational capital and its value.
The most common way of measuring organizational capital is to treat organizational cap-
ital as "Solow residual" at the ￿rm or plant level(Corrado et al 2005). That is to net out
the contribution of others inputs such as physical capital and human capital in a speci￿ed
production function. However the "residual" can be contaminated by the technology and
knowledge factors that are not contained in the measures of physical capital and human
capital. Moreover it is not easy to tease out the e⁄ects of market demand and supply. The
task-based approach provides new scopes to identify organizational capital, for organization
process varies substantially across tasks, which are de￿ned by industrial characteristics, pro-
duction stage and product cycle. Furthermore, technologies in particular information and
communication technologies have signi￿cant impact on organization process. Variations in-
duced by technological change may allow for identi￿cation of the value of organizational
capital.
6.2 Organizational Rent
Organizational rent is the economic return to organizational capital. The distribution of ￿rm
pro￿ts between organizational rent and returns to other factors in particular human capital
is an important theme in organizational economics that is to be explored.
One key factor that generates and maintains organizational rent is complementarities. The
discussion in Section 3.1 shows that complementarities amplify individual talent through two
27channels. First, complementarities mitigate the extent of decreasing returns to scale at the
individual level. Second, the positive sorting induced by complementarities matches high tal-
ent with high talent and facilitates the multiplication of individual talent. The ampli￿cation
e⁄ect provides a mechanism through which small di⁄erences in individual skill create large
di⁄erences in performance at the ￿rm level. To the extent that competition is intensi￿ed by
the availability of su¢ ciently close alternatives and the homogeneity of workers in the mar-
ket, each individual can not capture the overall surplus by leaving the ￿rm.16 In general, the
distribution of surplus among production factors is determined by the bargaining between
the organization and the workers. In contrast, when talents are substitute to each other,
the surplus is mostly created by the superstars, who can easily appropriate the rent. The
task-based approach also identi￿es communication as a source of organizational rent since
communication works as a mechanism to integrate knowledge and create complementarities
among talents.
6.3 Organizational Growth
The idea that organization can grow through accumulating organizational capital stems from
the seminal work by Penrose (1959), who pointed out the signi￿cant role of managerial service
in the growth of the ￿rm. The theory has been elaborated by the evolutionary view of the ￿rm
(Nelson and Winter 1982) and the dynamic capabilities theory (see Augier and Teece 2006
for a recent review). The task-based approach articulates several points that complement to
the existing theory.
As emphasized by the resource/knowledge-based view of the ￿rm, organizational knowl-
edge, which is embodied in the human capital in the organization, is a driver of organi-
zational growth. Organizational process, which is the core of organizational capital, acts
as an augmented factor to organizational knowledge through e¢ cient utilization of existing
talent and optimal acquisition of knowledge. In particular, organization capital enhances
complementarities of production factors inside the ￿rm. Organizational growth often starts
with a technology shock that releases existing ￿rm resources such as knowledge and talent.
The "excess" resources, maybe in a minor scale, can trigger resource accumulation through
a complementary chain and become a signi￿cant source of capabilities. For example, an
improvement in communication of tacit knowledge allows managers to better leverage their
knowledge and increase the returns to their talent, which incentivizes the managers to acquire
more knowledge and enforces further leverage of their knowledge. As a result, organization
gradually expands to reach the new equilibrium. Thorough analyses of how exploring com-
plementarities enhance ￿rm performance are pursued by Milgrom and Roberts in a series of
in￿ uential research (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1992, 1995, Roberts 2004). The danger of
ingrained complementarities is that of falling into the traps of bad equilibria. Organizational
16However, even organizational rents generated by strong complementarities may be dissipated by market
competition, as Kremer (1993) shows in his analysis of O-Ring production functions.
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Figure 5: A Task-Based Organization Process and Structure
processes may facilitate the decumulation of organizational knowledge and the pace towards
bad equilibria.
Organizational capital itself is accumulable. This is one of the fundamental ideas in
the evolutionary theory of the ￿rm. Nelson and Winter (1982) claim that "organizations
remember by doing" and propose that " the routinization of activity in an organization
constitutes the most important form of storage of the organization￿ s speci￿c operational
knowledge." In the context of the task-based approach, communication as an integrating
mechanism stores the memory of organizational process. The memory can be expanded
through repeated interactions and routinization of managerial practices.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have developed a task-based approach to analyze organizational knowledge,
process and structure. Figure 5 articulates the procedures and mechanisms left blank in
Figure 1. The theory implies several general lessons.
1. Organization emerges to integrate disperse knowledge and coordinate talent in pro-
duction and is designed to complement the limitations of human ability. Organization is
sustained by acquiring relevant knowledge and allocating talent to right positions.
2. Organizational knowledge is task-oriented. The complexity of task determines the
optimal level of knowledge acquisition and talent. The relations between tasks, namely,
complementarities (substitutability) and synergies, determine the allocation of knowledge
among members of the organization.
3. Communication shapes the relation between individual talent and governs the orga-
29nizational process and structure that integrates disperse knowledge to perform tasks more
e¢ ciently.
4. Organizational structure can also be deliberately designed ex ante to correct bias of
individual judgement, the extent to which is dependent on the attributes of tasks.
5. Organization process and the routinized organizational structure are the core of orga-
nizational capital, which generates rent and sustains organizational growth.
We believe that the task-based approach enriches the existing body of organization stud-
ies, in particular the knowledge-based theory of the ￿rm and the dynamic capabilities theory.
One main contribution of this approach is that it generates empirically testable results that
may uncover the underlying mechanism that shapes existing organizational structure and
managerial practices. This is on the agenda for further research. Also, the task-based ap-
proach is con￿ned within the traditional team theory framework where coordination is the
sole concern of the organization. Future research is intended to incorporate the growing
incentive-based theory of the ￿rm.
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